2013 Dewey Lecture: College—What Is It Good For? by Labaree, David F
Education and culturE 30 (1) (2014): 3-15    3
2013 Dewey Lecture:  
coLLege—what Is It gooD For?
David F. Labaree
Delivered as the 55th Annual John Dewey Lecture, sponsored by the John 
Dewey Society, at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research 
Association in San Francisco, April 27, 2013.
I want to say up front that I’m here under false pretenses. I’m not a Dewey scholar 
or a philosopher; I’m a sociologist doing history in the field of education. And the 
title of my lecture is a bit deceptive. I’m not really going to talk about what college is 
good for. Instead, I’m going to talk about how the institution we know as the modern 
American university came into being. As a sociologist, I’m more interested in the 
structure of the institution than in its philosophical aims. It’s not that I’m opposed 
to these aims. In fact, I love working in a university where these kinds of pursuits 
are open to us: where we can enjoy the free flow of ideas; where we explore any is-
sue in the sciences or humanities that engages us; and where we can go wherever 
the issue leads without worrying about utility or orthodoxy or politics. It’s a great 
privilege to work in such an institution. And this is why I want to spend some time 
examining how this institution developed its basic form in the improbable context 
of the United States in the nineteenth century. 
My argument is that the true hero of the story is the evolved form of the Ameri-
can university, and that all the good things, like free speech, are the side effects of 
a structure that arose for other purposes. Indeed, I argue that the institution—an 
intellectual haven in a heartless utilitarian world—depends on attributes that we 
would publicly deplore: opacity, chaotic complexity, and hypocrisy.
I tell this story in three parts. I start by exploring how the American sys-
tem of higher education emerged in the nineteenth century, without a plan and 
without any apparent promise that it would turn out well. By 1900, I show how 
all the pieces of the current system had come together. This is the historical part. 
Then I show how the combination of these elements created an astonishingly 
strong, resilient, and powerful structure. I look at the way this structure deftly 
balances competing aims—the populist, the practical, and the elite. This is the 
sociological part. Then I veer back toward the issue raised in the title, to figure 
out what the connection is between the form of American higher education and 
the things that it is good for. This is the vaguely philosophical part. I argue that 
the form serves the extraordinarily useful functions of protecting those of us in 
the faculty from the real world, protecting us from each other, and hiding what 
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we’re doing behind a set of fictions and veneers that keep anyone from knowing 
exactly what is really going on. 
In this light, I look at some of the things that could kill it for us. One is trans-
parency. The current accountability movement directed toward higher education 
could ruin everything by shining a light on the multitude of conflicting aims, hid-
den cross-subsidies, and forbidden activities that constitute life in the university. 
A second is disaggregation. I’m talking about current proposals to pare down the 
complexity of the university in the name of efficiency: Let online modules take over 
undergraduate teaching; eliminate costly residential colleges; closet research in 
separate institutes; and get rid of football. These changes would destroy the synergy 
that comes from the university’s complex structure. A third is principle. I argue that 
the university is a procedural institution, and that it would collapse if we all acted 
on principle instead of form. I end with a call for us to retreat from substance and 
stand shoulder-to-shoulder in defense of procedure. 
Historical roots oF tHE systEm
The origins of the American system of higher education could not have been more 
humble or less promising of future glory. It was a system, but it had no overall struc-
ture of governance and it did not emerge from a plan. It just happened, through an 
evolutionary process that had direction but no purpose. We have a higher education 
system in the same sense that we have a solar system, each of which emerged over 
time according to its own rules. These rules shaped the behavior of the system but 
they were not the product of intelligent design. 
Yet there was something about this system that produced extraordinary in-
stitutional growth. When George Washington assumed the presidency of the new 
republic in 1789, the US already had 19 colleges and universities (Tewksbury, 1932, 
Table 1; Collins, 1979, Table 5.2). By 1830 the numbers rose to 50 and then growth 
accelerated, with the total reaching 250 in 1860, 563 in 1870, and 811 in 1880. To 
give some perspective, the number of universities in the United Kingdom between 
1800 and 1880 rose from 6 to 10 and in all of Europe from 111 to 160 (Rüegg, 2004). 
So in 1880 this upstart system had five times as many institutions of higher educa-
tion as did the entire continent of Europe. How did this happen?
Keep in mind that the university as an institution was born in medieval Eu-
rope in the space between the dominant sources of power and wealth, the church and 
the state, and it drew its support over the years from these two sources. But higher 
education in the US emerged in a post-feudal frontier setting where the conditions 
were quite different. The key to understanding the nature of the American system 
of higher education is that it arose under conditions where the market was strong, 
the state was weak, and the church was divided. In the absence of any overarching 
authority with the power and money to support a system, individual colleges had 
to find their own sources of support in order to get started and keep going. They 
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had to operate as independent enterprises in the competitive economy of higher 
education, and their primary reasons for being had little to do with higher learning.
In the early- and mid-nineteenth century, the modal form of higher educa-
tion in the US was the liberal arts college. This was a non-profit corporation with a 
state charter and a lay board, which would appoint a president as CEO of the new 
enterprise. The president would then rent a building, hire a faculty, and start re-
cruiting students. With no guaranteed source of funding, the college had to make a 
go of it on its own, depending heavily on tuition from students and donations from 
prominent citizens, alumni, and religious sympathizers. For college founders, loca-
tion was everything. However, whereas European universities typically emerged in 
major cities, these colleges in the US arose in small towns far from urban popula-
tion centers. Not a good strategy if your aim was to draw a lot of students. But the 
founders had other things in mind.
One central motive for founding colleges was to promote religious denomi-
nations. The large majority of liberal arts colleges in this period had a religious af-
filiation and a clergyman as president. The US was an extremely competitive mar-
ket for religious groups seeking to spread the faith, and colleges were a key way to 
achieve this end. With colleges, they could prepare their own clergy and provide 
higher education for their members; and these goals were particularly important 
on the frontier, where the population was growing and the possibilities for denomi-
national expansion were the greatest. Every denomination wanted to plant the flag 
in the new territories, which is why Ohio came to have so many colleges. The de-
nomination provided a college with legitimacy, students, and a built-in donor pool 
but with little direct funding.
Another motive for founding colleges was closely allied with the first, and that 
was land speculation. Establishing a college in town was not only a way to advance 
the faith, it was also a way to raise property values. If town fathers could attract a 
college, they could make the case that the town was no mere agricultural village 
but a cultural center, the kind of place where prospective land buyers would want 
to build a house, set up a business, and raise a family. Starting a college was cheap 
and easy. It would bear the town’s name and serve as its cultural symbol. With luck 
it would give the town leverage to become a county seat or gain a station on the rail 
line. So a college was a good investment in a town’s future prosperity (Brown, 1995).
The liberal arts college was the dominant but not the only form that higher 
education took in nineteenth century America. Three other types of institutions 
emerged before 1880. One was state universities, which were founded and governed 
by individual states but which received only modest state funding. Like liberal arts 
colleges, they arose largely for competitive reasons. They emerged in the new states 
as the frontier moved westward, not because of huge student demand but because 
of the need for legitimacy. You couldn’t be taken seriously as a state unless you had 
a state university, especially if your neighbor had just established one. 
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The second form of institution was the land-grant college, which arose from 
federal efforts to promote land sales in the new territories by providing public land 
as a founding grant for new institutions of higher education. Turning their backs 
on the classical curriculum that had long prevailed in colleges, these schools had 
a mandate to promote practical learning in fields such as agriculture, engineering, 
military science, and mining. 
The third form was the normal school, which emerged in the middle of the 
century as state-founded high-school-level institutions for the preparation of teach-
ers. It wasn’t until the end of the century that these schools evolved into teachers col-
leges; and in the twentieth century they continued that evolution, turning first into 
full-service state colleges and then by midcentury into regional state universities. 
Unlike liberal arts colleges, all three of these types of institutions were initiated 
by and governed by states, and all received some public funding. But this funding 
was not nearly enough to keep them afloat, so they faced similar challenges as the 
liberal arts colleges, since their survival depended heavily on their ability to bring 
in student tuition and draw donations. In short, the liberal arts college established 
the model for survival in a setting with a strong market, weak state, and divided 
church; and the newer public institutions had to play by the same rules.
By 1880, the structure of the American system of higher education was well 
established. It was a system made up of lean and adaptable institutions, with a strong 
base in rural communities, and led by entrepreneurial presidents, who kept a sharp 
eye out for possible threats and opportunities in the highly competitive higher-edu-
cation market. These colleges had to attract and keep the loyalty of student consum-
ers, whose tuition was critical for paying the bills and who had plenty of alterna-
tives in towns nearby. And they also had to maintain a close relationship with local 
notables, religious peers, and alumni, who provided a crucial base of donations.
The system was only missing two elements to make it workable in the long 
term. It lacked sufficient students, and it lacked academic legitimacy. On the student 
side, this was the most overbuilt system of higher education the world has ever seen. 
In 1880, 811 colleges were scattered across a thinly populated countryside, which 
amounted to 16 colleges per million of population (Collins, 1979, Table 5.2). The 
average college had only 131 students and 14 faculty and granted 17 degrees per 
year (Carter et al., 2006, Table Bc523, Table Bc571; US Bureau of the Census, 1975, 
Series H 751). As I have shown, these colleges were not established in response to 
student demand, but nonetheless they depended on students for survival. Without 
a sharp growth in student enrollments, the whole system would have collapsed. 
On the academic side, these were colleges in name only. They were paro-
chial in both senses of the word, small town institutions stuck in the boondocks 
and able to make no claim to advancing the boundaries of knowledge. They were 
not established to promote higher learning, and they lacked both the intellectual 
and economic capital required to carry out such a mission. Many high schools had 
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stronger claims to academic prowess than these colleges. European visitors in the 
nineteenth century had a field day ridiculing the intellectual poverty of these institu-
tions. The system was on death watch. If it was going to be able to survive, it needed 
a transfusion that would provide both student enrollments and academic legitimacy. 
That transfusion arrived just in time from a new European import, the Ger-
man research university. This model offered everything that was lacking in the 
American system. It reinvented university professors as the best minds of the genera-
tion, whose expertise was certified by the new entry-level degree, the Ph.D., and who 
were pushing back the frontiers of knowledge through scientific research. It intro-
duced graduate students to the college campus, who would be selected for their high 
academic promise and trained to follow in the footsteps of their faculty mentors. 
And at the same time that the German model offered academic credibility to 
the American system, the peculiarly Americanized form of this model made uni-
versity enrollment attractive for undergraduates, whose focus was less on higher 
learning than on jobs and parties. The remodeled American university provided 
credible academic preparation in the cognitive skills required for professional and 
managerial work; and it provided training in the social and political skills required 
for corporate employment, through the process of playing the academic game and 
taking on roles in intercollegiate athletics and on-campus social clubs. It also prom-
ised a social life in which one could have a good time and meet a suitable spouse. 
By 1900, with the arrival of the research university as the capstone, nearly 
all of the core elements of the current American system of higher education were 
in place. Subsequent developments focused primarily on extending the system 
downward, adding layers that would make it more accessible to larger numbers of 
students—as normal schools evolved into regional state universities and as commu-
nity colleges emerged as the open-access base of an increasingly stratified system. 
Here ends the history portion of this account. Now we move on to the sociological 
part of the story.1
sociological traits oF tHE systEm
When the research university model arrived to save the day in the 1880s, the Ameri-
can system of higher education was in desperate straits. But at the same time this 
system had an enormous reservoir of potential strengths that prepared it for its 
future climb to world dominance. Let’s consider some of these strengths. First, it 
had a huge capacity in place, the largest in the world by far: campuses, buildings, 
faculty, administration, curriculum, and a strong base in the community. All it 
needed was students and credibility. 
Second, it consisted of a group of institutions that had figured out how to sur-
vive under dire Darwinian circumstances, where supply greatly exceeded demand 
and where there was no secure stream of funding from church or state. In order 
to keep the enterprises afloat, they had learned how to hustle for market position, 
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troll for students, and dun donors. Imagine how well this played out when students 
found a reason to line up at their doors and donors suddenly saw themselves invest-
ing in a winner with a soaring intellectual and social mission. 
Third, they had learned to be extraordinarily sensitive to consumer demand, 
upon which everything depended. Fourth, as a result they became lean and highly 
adaptable enterprises, which were not bounded by the politics of state policy or the 
dogma of the church but could take advantage of any emerging possibility for a 
new program, a new kind of student or donor, or a new area of research. Not only 
were they able to adapt but they were forced to do so quickly, since otherwise the 
competition would jump on the opportunity first and eat their lunch.
By the time the research university arrived on the scene, the American sys-
tem of higher education was already firmly established and governed by its own 
peculiar laws of motion and its own evolutionary patterns. The university did not 
transform the system. Instead it crowned the system and made it viable for a cen-
tury of expansion and elevation. Americans could not simply adopt the German 
university model, since this model depended heavily on strong state support, which 
was lacking in the US. And the American system would not sustain a university as 
elevated as the German university, with its tight focus on graduate education and 
research at the expense of other functions. American universities that tried to pur-
sue this approach—such as Clark University and Johns Hopkins—found themselves 
quickly trailing the pack of institutions that adopted a hybrid model grounded in 
the preexisting American system. In the US, the research university provided a cru-
cial add-on rather than a transformation. In this institutionally-complex market-
based system, the research university became embedded within a convoluted but 
highly functional structure of cross-subsidies, interwoven income streams, widely 
dispersed political constituencies, and a bewildering array of goals and functions. 
At the core of the system is a delicate balance among three starkly different 
models of higher education. These three roughly correspond to Clark Kerr’s famous 
characterization of the American system as a mix of the British undergraduate col-
lege, the American land-grant college, and the German research university (Kerr, 
2001, p. 14). The first is the populist element, the second is the practical element, 
and the third is the elite element. Let me say a little about each of these and make 
the case for how they work to reinforce each other and shore up the overall system. 
I argue that these three elements are unevenly distributed across the whole system, 
with the populist and practical parts strongest in the lower tiers of the system, where 
access is easy and job utility are central, and the elite is strongest in the upper tier. 
But I also argue that all three are present in the research university at the top of the 
system. Consider how all these elements come together in a prototypical flagship 
state university.
The populist element has its roots in the British residential undergraduate 
college, which colonists had in mind when they established the first American col-
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leges; but the changes that emerged in the US in the early nineteenth century were 
critical. Key was the fact that American colleges during this period were broadly 
accessible in a way that colleges in the UK never were until the advent of the red-
brick universities after the Second World War. American colleges were not located 
in fashionable areas in major cities but in small towns in the hinterland. There were 
far too many of them for them to be elite, and the need for students meant that 
tuition and academic standards both had to be kept relatively low. The American 
college never exuded the odor of class privilege to the same degree as Oxbridge; its 
clientele was largely middle class. For the new research university, this legacy meant 
that the undergraduate program provided critical economic and political support. 
From the economic perspective, undergrads paid tuition, which—through 
large classes and thus the need for graduate teaching assistants—supported gradu-
ate programs and the larger research enterprise. Undergrads, who were socialized 
in the rituals of football and fraternities, were also the ones who identified most 
closely with the university, which meant that in later years they became the most 
loyal donors. As doers rather than thinkers, they were also the wealthiest group of 
alumni donors. Politically, the undergraduate program gave the university a broad 
base of community support. Since anyone could conceive of attending the state 
university, the institution was never as remote or alien as the German model. Its 
athletic teams and academic accomplishments were a point of pride for state resi-
dents, whether or not they or their children ever attended. They wore the school 
colors and cheered for it on game days.
The practical element has its root in the land-grant college. The idea here 
was that the university was not just an enterprise for providing liberal education 
for the elite but that it could also provide useful occupational skills for ordinary 
people. Since the institution needed to attract a large group of students to pay the 
bills, the American university left no stone unturned when it came to developing 
programs that students might want. It promoted itself as a practical and reliable 
mechanism for getting a good job. This not only boosted enrollment, it also sent 
a message to the citizens of the state that the university was making itself useful 
to the larger community, producing the teachers, engineers, managers, and dental 
hygienists that they needed. 
This practical bent also extended to the university’s research effort, which 
was not just focusing on ivory tower pursuits. Its researchers were working hard 
to design safer bridges, more productive crops, better vaccines, and more reliable 
student tests. For example, when I taught at Michigan State I planted my lawn with 
Spartan grass seed, which was developed at the university. These forms of applied 
research led to patents that brought substantial income back to the institution, but 
their most important function was to provide a broad base of support for the uni-
versity among people who had no connection with it as an instructional or intellec-
tual enterprise. The idea was compelling: This is your university, working for you. 
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The elite element has its roots in the German research university. This is the 
component of the university formula that gives the institution academic credibility 
at the highest level. Without it the university would just be a party school for the 
intellectually challenged and a trade school for job seekers. From this angle, the 
university is the haven for the best thinkers, where professors can pursue intellec-
tual challenges of the first order, develop cutting edge research in a wide array of 
domains, and train graduate students who will carry on these pursuits in the next 
generation. And this academic aura envelops the entire enterprise, giving the lowli-
est freshman exposure to the most distinguished faculty and allowing the average 
graduate to sport a diploma burnished by the academic reputations of the best and 
the brightest. The problem, of course, is that supporting professorial research and 
advanced graduate study is enormously expensive; research grants only provide a 
fraction of the needed funds. 
So the populist and practical domains of the university are critically important 
components of the larger university package. Without the foundation of fraternities 
and football, grass seed and teacher education, the superstructure of academic ac-
complishment would collapse of its own weight. The academic side of the university 
can’t survive without both the financial subsidies and political support that come 
from the populist and the practical sides. And the populist and practical sides rely 
on the academic legitimacy that comes from the elite side. It’s the mixture of the 
three that constitutes the core strength of the American system of higher education. 
This is why it is so resilient, so adaptable, so wealthy, and so powerful. This is why 
its financial and political base is so broad and strong. And this is why American 
institutions of higher education enjoy so much autonomy: They respond to many 
sources of power in American society and they rely on many sources of support, 
which means they are not the captive of any single power source or revenue stream.2
tHE PowEr oF Form
So my story about the American system of higher education is that it succeeded by 
developing a structure that allowed it to become both economically rich and politi-
cally autonomous. It could tap multiple sources of revenue and legitimacy, which 
allowed it to avoid becoming the wholly owned subsidiary of the state, the church, 
or the market. And by virtue of its structurally reinforced autonomy, college is good 
for a great many things.
At last we come back to our topic. What is college good for? For those of us 
on faculties of research universities, they provide several core benefits that we see 
as especially important. At the top of the list is that they preserve and promote free 
speech. They are zones where faculty and students can feel free to pursue any idea, 
any line of argument, and any intellectual pursuit that they wish—free of the con-
straints of political pressure, cultural convention, or material interest. Closely related 
to this is the fact that universities become zones where play is not only permissible 
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but even desirable, where it’s ok to pursue an idea just because it’s intriguing, even 
though there is no apparent practical benefit that this pursuit would produce.
This, of course, is a rather idealized version of the university. In practice, as 
we know, politics, convention, and economics constantly intrude on the zone of 
autonomy in an effort to shape the process and limit these freedoms. This is par-
ticularly true in the lower strata of the system. My argument is not that the ideal 
is met but that the structure of American higher education—especially in the top 
tier of the system—creates a space of relative autonomy, where these constraining 
forces are partially held back, allowing the possibility for free intellectual pursuits 
that cannot be found anywhere else. 
Free intellectual play is what we in the faculty tend to care about, but others 
in American society see other benefits arising from higher education that justify 
the enormous time and treasure that we devote to supporting the system. Policy-
makers and employers put primary emphasis on higher education as an engine of 
human capital production, which provides the economically relevant skills that 
drive increases in worker productivity and growth in the GDP. They also hail it as 
a place of knowledge production, where people develop valuable technologies, the-
ories, and inventions that can feed directly into the economy. And companies use 
it as a place to outsource much of their needs for workforce training and research-
and-development. 
These pragmatic benefits that people see coming from the system of higher 
education are real. Universities truly are socially useful in such ways. But it’s impor-
tant to keep in mind that these social benefits can only arise if the university remains 
a preserve for free intellectual play. Universities are much less useful to society if 
they restrict themselves to the training of individuals for particular present-day jobs, 
or to the production of research to solve current problems. They are most useful if 
they function as storehouses for knowledge, skills, technologies, and theories—for 
which there is no current application but which may turn out to be enormously use-
ful in the future. They are the mechanism by which modern societies build capacity 
to deal with issues that have not yet emerged but sooner or later are likely to do so.
But that is a discussion for another speech by another scholar. The point I 
want make today about the American system of higher education is that it is good 
for a lot of things but it was established in order to accomplish none of these things. 
As I have shown, the system that arose in the nineteenth century was not trying 
to store knowledge, produce capacity, or increase productivity. And it wasn’t try-
ing to promote free speech or encourage play with ideas. It wasn’t even trying to 
preserve institutional autonomy. These things happened as the system developed, 
but they were all unintended consequences. What was driving development of the 
system was a clash of competing interests, all of which saw the college as a useful 
medium for meeting particular ends. Religious denominations saw them as a way 
to spread the faith. Town fathers saw them as a way to promote local development 
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and increase property values. The federal government saw them as a way to spur 
the sale of federal lands. State governments saw them as a way to establish cred-
ibility in competition with other states. College presidents and faculty saw them as 
a way to promote their own careers. And at the base of the whole process of system 
development were the consumers, the students, without whose enrollment and tu-
ition and donations the system would not have been able to persist. The consum-
ers saw the college as useful in a number of ways: as a medium for seeking social 
opportunity and achieving social mobility; as a medium for preserving social ad-
vantage and avoiding downward mobility; as a place to have a good time, enjoy an 
easy transition to adulthood, pick up some social skills, and meet a spouse; even, 
sometimes, as a place to learn. 
The point is that the primary benefits of the system of higher education de-
rive from its form, but this form did not arise in order to produce these benefits. 
We need to preserve the form in order to continue enjoying these benefits, but 
unfortunately the organizational foundations upon which the form is built are, 
on the face of it, absurd. And each of these foundational qualities is currently 
under attack from the perspective of alternative visions that, in contrast, have a 
certain face validity. It the attackers accomplish their goals, the system’s form, 
which has been so enormously productive over the years, will collapse, and with 
this collapse will come the end of the university as we know it. I didn’t promise 
this lecture would end well, did I?
Let me spell out three challenges that would undercut the core autonomy 
and synergy that makes the system so productive in its current form. On the sur-
face, each of the proposed changes seems quite sensible and desirable. Only by ex-
amining the implications of actually pursuing these changes can we see how they 
threaten the foundational qualities that currently undergird the system. The system’s 
foundations are so paradoxical, however, that mounting a public defense of them 
would be difficult indeed. Yet it is precisely these traits of the system that we need 
to defend in order to preserve the current highly functional form of the university. 
In what follows, I am drawing inspiration from the work of Suzanne Lohmann 
(2004, 2006), a political scientist at UCLA, who is the scholar who has addressed 
these issues most astutely.
One challenge comes from prospective reformers of American higher educa-
tion who want to promote transparency. Who can be against that? This idea derives 
from the accountability movement, which has already swept across K-12 education 
and is now pounding the shores of higher education. It simply asks universities to 
show people what they’re doing. What is the university doing with its money and its 
effort? Who is paying for what? How do the various pieces of the complex structure 
of the university fit together? And are they self-supporting or drawing resources 
from elsewhere? What is faculty credit-hour production? How is tuition related to 
instructional costs? And so on. These demands make a lot of sense. 
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The problem, however, as I have shown today, is that the autonomy of the 
university depends on its ability to shield its inner workings from public scrutiny. 
It relies on opacity. Autonomy will end if the public can see everything that is go-
ing on and what everything costs. Consider all of the cross subsidies that keep the 
institution afloat: undergraduates support graduate education, football supports la-
crosse, adjuncts subsidize professors, rich schools subsidize poor schools. Consider 
all of the instructional activities that would wilt in the light of day; consider all of 
the research projects that could be seen as useless or politically unacceptable. The 
current structure keeps the inner workings of the system obscure, which protects 
the university from intrusions on its autonomy. Remember, this autonomy arose by 
accident not by design; its persistence depends on keeping the details of university 
operations out of public view. 
A second and related challenge comes from reformers who seek to promote 
disaggregation. The university is an organizational nightmare, they say, with all of 
those institutes and centers, departments and schools, programs and administrative 
offices. There are no clear lines of authority, no mechanisms to promote efficiency 
and eliminate duplication, no tools to achieve economies of scale. Transparency is 
one step in the right direction, they say, but the real reform that is needed is to take 
apart the complex interdependencies and overlapping responsibilities within the 
university and then figure out how each of these tasks could be accomplished in the 
most cost-effective and outcome-effective manner. Why not have a few star profes-
sors tape lectures and then offer Massive Open Online Courses at colleges across 
the country? Why not have institutions specialize in what they’re best at—remedial 
education, undergraduate instruction, vocational education, research production, 
graduate or student training? Putting them together into a single institution is ex-
pensive and grossly inefficient. 
But recall that it is precisely the aggregation of purposes and functions—the 
combination of the populist, the practical, and the elite—that has made the univer-
sity so strong, so successful, and, yes, so useful. This combination creates a strong 
base both financially and politically and allows for forms of synergy than cannot 
happen with a set of isolated educational functions. The fact is that this institution 
can’t be disaggregated without losing what makes it the kind of university that stu-
dents, policymakers, employers, and the general public find so compelling. A key or-
ganizational element that makes the university so effective is its chaotic complexity.
A third challenge comes not from reformers intruding on the university 
from the outside but from faculty members meddling with it from the inside. The 
threat here arises from the dangerous practice of acting on academic principle. 
Fortunately, this is not very common in academe. But the danger is lurking in the 
background of every decision about faculty hires. Here’s how it works. You review 
a finalist for a faculty position in a field not closely connected to your own, and you 
find to your horror that the candidate’s intellectual domain seems absurd on the 
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face of it (how can anyone take this type of work seriously?) and the candidate’s 
own scholarship doesn’t seem credible. So you decide to speak against hiring the 
candidate and organize colleagues to support your position. But then you happen 
to read a paper by Suzanne Lohmann, who points out something very fundamental 
about how universities work. 
Universities are structured in a manner that protects the faculty from the out-
side world (that is, protecting them from the forces of transparency and disaggrega-
tion), but it’s also organized in a manner that protects the faculty from each other. 
The latter is the reason we have such an enormous array of departments and schools 
in universities. If every historian had to meet the approval of geologists and every 
psychologist had be meet the approval of law faculty, no one would ever be hired. 
The simple fact is that part of what keeps universities healthy and autonomous 
is hypocrisy. Because of the Balkanized structure of university organization, we all 
have our own protected spaces to operate in and we all pass judgment only on our 
own peers within that space. To do otherwise would be disastrous. We don’t have to 
respect each other’s work across campus, we merely need to tolerate it—grumbling 
about each other in private and making nice in public. You pick your faculty, we’ll 
pick ours. Lohmann (2006) calls this core procedure of the academy “log-rolling.” 
If we all operated on principle, if we all only approved scholars we respected, then 
the university would be a much diminished place. Put another way, I wouldn’t want 
to belong to a university that consisted only of people I found worthy. Gone would 
be the diversity of views, paradigms, methodologies, theories, and world views that 
makes the university such a rich place. The result is incredibly messy, and it permits 
a lot of quirky—even ridiculous—research agendas, courses, and instructional pro-
grams. But in aggregate, this libertarian chaos includes an extraordinary range of 
ideas, capacities, theories, and social possibilities. It’s exactly the kind of mess we 
need to treasure and preserve and defend against all opponents.
So here is the thought I’m leaving you with. The American system of higher 
education is enormously productive and useful, and it’s a great resource for stu-
dents, faculty, policymakers, employers, and society. What makes it work is not its 
substance but its form. Crucial to its success is its devotion to three formal quali-
ties: opacity, chaotic complexity, and hypocrisy. Embrace these forms and they 
will keep us free.
bibliograPHy
Brown, David K. (1995). Degrees of Control: A Sociology of Educational Expansion 
and Occupational Credentialism. New York: Teachers College Press.
Carter, Susan B., et al. (2006). Historical Statistics of the United States, millennial 
education online. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Collins, Randall. (1979). The Credential Society: An Historical Sociology of Education 
and Stratification. New York: Academic Press.
2013 dEwEy lEcturE    15
Volume 30 (1) 2014
Kerr, C. (2001). The Uses of the University (5th ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Labaree, David F. (2013a). “The Power of the Parochial in Shaping the American 
System of Higher Education.” In Paul Smeyers and Marc Depaepe (Eds.), 
Educational Research: Institutional Spaces of Educational Research (pp. 31–46). 
Dordrecht: Springer.
Labaree, David F. (2013b). “A System without a Plan: Emergence of an American 
System of Higher Education in the Twentieth Century.” Bildungsgeschichte: 
International Journal for the Historiography of Education, 3(1): 46–59.
Lohmann, Suzanne. (2006). The Public Research University as a Complex Adaptive 
System. Unpublished paper, University of California, Los Angeles.
Lohmann, Susanne. (2004). “Darwinian Medicine for the University.” In Ronald 
G. Ehrenberg (Ed.), Governing Academia (pp. 71–90). Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press.
Tewksbury, D.G. (1932). The Founding of American Colleges and Universities 
before the Civil War. New York: Teachers College Press.
Rüegg, Walter. (2004). “European Universities and Similar Institutions in Existence 
between 1812 and the End of 1944: A Chronological List: Universities.” In 
Walter Rüegg, A history of the university in Europe, vol. 3. London: Cambridge 
University Press.
US Bureau of the Census. (1975). Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial 
Times to 1970, Part 1. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office.
notEs
1. For a more detailed historical account of the system’s growth in the nineteenth cen-
tury, see Labaree (2013a).
2. For a more detailed sociological account of the strengths of the American higher 
education system, see Labaree (2013b).
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